

SUPREME COURT OF SEYCHELLES

Reportable
MA 234/2024
(Arising in MC 08/2024)

In the matter between:

THE GOVERNMENT OF SEYCHELLES
(Represented by Mr Barry Galinoma)

Applicant

and

STEVE CHANG-TAVE

1st Respondent

NATASHA CHANG-TAVE

2nd Respondent

NORTHERN STAR PTY LTD
(Represented by Ms Molle)

3rd Respondent

Neutral Citation: *The Government of Seychelles vs Chang-Tave & Ors* (MA 234/2024) (20 October 2025)

Before: Adeline J

Summary: Application for leave to intervene in proceedings for a disposal order against the Respondents under Section 5 of the Proceeds of Crime (Civil Confiscation) Act, 2008 read with Section 117 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure.

Heard: By way of submissions of counsels.

Delivered: 20 October 2025

FINAL ORDER

I find no merit to allow the application, and accordingly, the application is dismissed.

RULING ON APPLICATION

Adeline, J

[1] This ruling pertains to an application made by one Jean Mellie, (“the Applicant”) pursuant to Section 117 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure (SCCP) and in respect of Section

- [6] Mr Mellie also avers that, should the present application be directed against him, Section 5(5) of POCCCA requires that the application clearly states the Respondent's name, address, and national identity number. Since this has not been done, he maintains, that the application is defective for non-compliance with the statutory requirements.
- [7] It is the submission of Mr Mellie that, although the annexure marked DJ2 shows that, three vehicles (numbers 3, 4, and 12) are registered in his name, he is not cited as a Respondent in the matter. In Mr Mellie's view, he has been deprived of the opportunity to exercise his right to defend the motion. He observes, that the application also cites a third Respondent, Northern Star Pty Ltd, which is not listed as owner of any of the properties or vehicles in DJ2, and that the Applicant fails to disclose who represents this entity or whether it was a party to case MC 63/2019. He produces as Annexure JM1 registered documents evidencing ownership of vehicles 5, 6, 9, and 10 which are registered unto Northern Star Car Hire Pty Ltd, and attaches as JM2 a letter he wrote to the President in 2020 raising concerns regarding the same matter.
- [8] It is contended by Mr Mellie that, under Section 5(1) of POCCCA, the application should set out the particulars of the property sought to be disposed of. Mr Mellie avers that, to his personal knowledge, many of the vehicles listed have already been disposed of, and therefore the application is defective in purporting to seek orders over property which is no longer in existence. Mr Mellie maintains that the vehicles were seized pursuant to a court order dated 18 November 2019, and have since been disposed of even before the 1st and 2nd Respondents were convicted. On that basis, he argues, that the affidavit of Sergeant Dave Jeanne is defective as it fails to disclose the current status and nature of the property to be disposed of, and is misleading in asserting that all averments are true to the best of the deponent's knowledge and belief.
- [9] Mr. Mellie submits that, having been served with documents to appear in the case, and given the errors outlined, the Court is bound under Section 5(8)(1) of POCCCA to give any person with an interest in the property an opportunity to be heard before making a disposal order. He prays, that the Court invokes this provision to allow him to show cause why the order should not be made. He further invokes Section 5(9) requesting that the

Court exercises its discretion to grant him a period not exceeding three months to comply with Section 5(8) and to enable him to be heard in the interest of justice.

- [10] In addition, Mr. Mellie prays the Court to invoke Section 7 of POCCCA to make the appropriate orders allow him to discharge reasonable living and legal expenses relating to the case subject to any conditions the Court deems fit. He also requests access to the case files in MC 63/2019 and ex parte Application 68/2019, asserting that proper investigation would reveal, that he has not been convicted of any drugs-related offence connected to these proceedings. He maintains that, his motion is properly brought under Section 117 of the SCCP, as he seeks to maintain his rights and be granted leave to intervene as a person with an interest in the property subject to disposal.
- [11] Mr. Mellie did tender in evidence an additional affidavit in reply to the affidavit of Sergeant Dave Jeanne dated 29 July 2025. In this affidavit, he reiterates and adopts his earlier affidavit, maintaining that the application for a Disposal Order remains defective. He avers, that the new affidavit filed by Sergeant Jeanne fails to address the main issue raised, namely, the ownership of three of the vehicles listed in DJ2 which he submits belong to him. He produces the same annexure highlighting the vehicles numbered 3, 4, and 12 marked JJM1, to demonstrate ownership.
- [12] Mr Mellie reiterated the fact that he is not named as Respondent in the application and that he is being prevented from exercising his right to defend the application. He again points out that the application lists Northern Star Pty Ltd as a Respondent without clarifying who represents the entity, particularly as it is no longer represented by Attorney Joel Camille. Mr Mellie maintains that, the new affidavit fails to clarify who owns Northern Star Car Hire Proprietary Limited despite its inclusion as a Respondent. He further reiterates that, under Section 5(b) of POCCCA, the application must provide clear particulars of the property sought to be disposed of, which the current application fails to do. It is the submission of Mr Mellie, that based on his personal enquiries, all vehicles listed in DJ2 have been disposed of since 2019 prior to the conviction of the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
- [13] In light of the above submissions, Mr. Mellie renews his prayer that the Court invokes Section 5(8) (1) and Section 5(9) of POCCCA to allow him to be heard, and Section 7 to

permit access to funds for necessary living and legal expenses. Mr Mellie again requests access to the relevant case files and reaffirms that he has never been convicted of any offence relating to the case. He concludes, stating, that this motion is made under Section 117 of the SCCP and prays that the Court grant him leave to intervene. He adds, that the statements contained in his affidavit are to the best of his knowledge, true, and those not within his knowledge are based on legal advice which he verily believes to be correct.

[14] Learned counsel for Mr Mellie indicated, that it was upon reading the Judgment for the Interlocutory Order, that she became aware that Mr. Mellie had been implicated in the earlier proceedings. However, learned counsel observes that, the judgment was delivered on the 18 November 2019, and the present application was only filed on 25 September 2024.

[15] The vehicles listed in Annexure DJ2 are as follows:

- a) White Great Wall, registration number S20826, registered in the name of Jean Joseph Mellie, value of SCR195,652.00;
- b) Silver Great Wall, registration number S21923, registered in the name of Jean Joseph Mellie, with a value of SCR195,652.00;
- c) Pearl White Toyota Revo, registration number S460, registered in the name of Jean Joseph Mellie, with a value of SCR650, 000.00.

[16] In its submissions in reply, the Government of Seychelles (hereinafter referred to as the “Applicant”) states, in paragraph 3(ii) and (iii) of its affidavit, that Mr. Mellie had all the statutory options under POCCCA to seek and appeal against the court order. It is further submitted by the Applicant that, all the cars being claimed by Mr. Mellie were purchased by cash by the 1st and 2nd Respondents and were transferred to him with no financial transaction as evidence showing that the Respondents received any payment.

[17] The Applicant further states that, according to the Seychelles Licensing Authority (“SLA”), the 1st and 2nd Respondents are the representatives of the 3rd Respondent Company, and that Mr. Mellie is not listed as a representative. The cars numbered 9, 10 and 12 were

vehicles which were rented out and payments were made in to the joint accounts of the 1st and 2nd Respondents instead of the business account of the 3rd Respondent. The Applicant submits that, these irregularities are presented as examples of the use of the 3rd Respondent to conceal illicit drugs trafficking operations as stated in paragraph 32 of the Interlocutory Order, proving that the cars were proceeds of crime and that is why they were ordered to be confiscated.

- [18] The Applicant also states, that vehicles numbered 3 and 4 were paid for from cash deposits made by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, which appear to have been obtained from drug trafficking as set out in paragraph 36 of the same order. The Applicant further states, that with regard to vehicle number 5, the origin of the cash payments was not disclosed, and as per paragraph 37 of the order of Twomey CJ then, the only safe conclusion that could be made was that the purchase of the vehicle was acquired in part with proceeds of drugs trafficking.
- [19] The Applicant submits, that the rights and interests of Mr. Mellie were properly addressed by her Ladyship Twomey CJ (as she was then) in her order delivered on the 18th November 2019, by way of an Interlocutory Order under Section 4 of POCCCA. The Applicant agrees that the vehicles were auctioned by the Government on 7th December 2019 and that the Applicant's motion has been amended accordingly.
- [20] The Applicant submits that, Mr. Mellie has no interest in the pending disposal order proceedings brought under Section 5 of POCCCA. It contends, that a disposal order may only be pursued if the requirements of Section 5(2) of POCCCA are satisfied, which prevent such an application while any interlocutory application or appeal under Section 4 is pending. It is further argued by the Applicant, that Mr. Mellie had the opportunity to apply to vary or discharge the interlocutory order under Section 4(3) of POCCCA, which allows any person claiming an interest in property to apply to the Court if the order causes injustice.
- [21] In support of its submissions, the Applicant refers to the case of Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1999) 2 S.C.R. 817, in which case, it was held that "*the values underlying the duty of procedural fairness relate to the principle that the individual*

or individuals affected should have the opportunity to present their case fully and fairly, and have decision affecting their rights, interests, or privileges made using a fair, impartial and open process, appropriate to the statutory, institutional and social context of the decisions.”

[22] It is argued by the Applicant that, Mr. Mellie had the right to bring his case under Section 4(3) of POCCCA when the interlocutory order was sought for and also to appeal against the order granted by Twomey (CJ then) on the 18th November 2019, given that the law provides a 12-month period before a disposal order can be granted for an appeal to be filed.

[23] The Applicant refers to the case of Houreau & Anor v Karunakaran & Ors (SCA 3 of 2017) [2017] SCCA 33 (19 September 2017), in which case the Court of Appeal analyzed the issue of intervention and noted that, intervention may be “*as of right*” or “*permissive*.” The Court held that, for intervention “*as of right*,” the intervener must show that:

- (i) the intervener has an interest related to the property or transaction involved in the case;*
- (ii) the intervener cannot adequately protect her own interests unless she is included in the case; and*
- (iii) none of the parties already in the case can adequately represent the intervener's interests.”*

[24] The Applicant concludes its submissions, stating, that Mr. Mellie has no interest involved in the case and should not be included as the parties to the proceedings are the only ones with an actual interest. It is the Applicant’s view that, Mr Mellie was merely used by the Respondents to conceal their proceeds of crime. The Applicant therefore submits that, all matters concerning Mr. Mellie were clearly dealt with by the Interlocutory Order delivered, and prays this Honourable Court to dismiss Mr Mellie’s application to intervene under Section 117 of the SCCP with costs.

- [25] Sergeant Dave Jeanne, presently based at the Financial Crime Investigation Unit of the Seychelles Police Force (“FCIU”), deposed to an affidavit in support of the application for a disposal order and another one in reply to the application for intervention by Mr. Mellie.
- [26] He states, that an Interlocutory Order was made by the then Chief Justice Dr. Mathilda Twomey, then sitting as Judge of the Supreme Court, under Section 4 of the POCCCA on the 18th November 2019, prohibiting the Respondents from disposing of or otherwise dealing with the whole or any part of the specified property or diminishing its value. Immediately thereafter, an order was made under Section 8 of the POCCCA appointing Mr. Hein Prinsloo, a then Superintendent in the Seychelles Police Force attached to the FCIU, as Receiver of the specified property on the terms set out in the said order. The Respondents were duly served with notice of the POCCCA application and did not contest it.
- [27] Chief Justice Twomey (as she then was) granted the application in favour of the Applicant, and a copy of the said order was produced and marked as “DJ1.” Sergeant Jeanne further states that, he conducted a formal investigation at the FCIU into the alleged claims of ownership made by Mr. Mellie regarding Northern Star Car Hire (Proprietary) Limited. The investigation, supported by documentation obtained from the Seychelles Licensing Authority (SLA) and annexed as “DJ2,” confirmed, that Mr. Mellie was not an owner, shareholder, or official of Northern Star Car Hire (Proprietary) Limited.
- [28] Sergeant Jeanne indicated that, the issue of ownership had already been fully addressed in prior legal proceedings in MC 63/2019, presided over by the then Chief Justice Twomey. In that matter, the Court found, that Mr. Mellie did not have any legal ownership or proprietary interest in Northern Star Car Hire (Proprietary) Limited as explicitly stated in the ruling.¹
- [29] Sergeant Jeanne avers, that the present application concerns the specified properties identified in annexure “DJ2.” He explains, that the application seeks a final disposal order pursuant to Section 5 of the POCCCA. He affirms that, the interlocutory order made on the

¹ Para 18 of Government of Seychelles v Chang Tave and anor (MC 63/2019) [2019] SCSC 1006 (18 November 2019).

18th November 2019 has been in force for not less than twelve months as required under Section 5(1) of the POCCCA, and that there is no appeal pending before the Court of Appeal in respect of that order or any other order made under Section 4. He also confirms that there is no application pending under Section 4(3) of the POCCCA before any court in relation to the same property.

- [30] It is on the basis of these facts, that Sergeant Jeanne prays for an order for the final disposal of all the specified properties listed in annexure “DJ2,” including the items numbered 2–15 which were auctioned by the Government on the 7th December 2019 for a total sum of SCR 2,695,869.38. He details, that the sum represents proceeds from the sale of the following vehicles: One White Hyundai Eon, One White Great Wall, One Silver Great Wall, Four Hyundai Grand i10, Three Polar White Hyundai Grand i10, One Pearl White Toyota Revo, One Black Hyundai Tucson, One White Kia Carnival, and One bright Silver Kia Rio. Sergeant Jeanne states, that the proceeds are currently being held in a Receivership Account at ABSA Bank Seychelles. He requests, that the funds be transferred to the Republic, less any bank charges which ABSA Bank Seychelles may be entitled to deduct in accordance with Section 5 of the POCCCA.
- [31] Inspector Jeanne prays this Honourable Court, to make a disposal order pursuant to Section 5 of the POCCCA, transferring the whole of the specified properties identified in annexure “DJ2” to the Republic, being the proceeds held in the Receivership Account at ABSA Bank Seychelles. He also prays for such further or other orders as the Court may deem just and proper.
- [32] At this juncture, it is pertinent to first quote the following paragraphs from the case of *Government of Seychelles v Chang Tave and Anor* (MC 63/2019) [2019] SCSC 1006 (18 November 2019), which has given rise to this subsequent application for a disposal order in terms of Section 5 of POCCCA. In *Government of Seychelles v Chang Tave and Anor* (Supra), from para 41, the Court had this to say;

“Similarly, the Second Respondent signed a power of attorney in favour of her father, Mr. Mellie on 19 August 2019 signed by Counsel Mr. Joel Camille and also sent to the Licensing Authority informing them that five damaged vehicles namely S8836, S20826, S

21923, S32185, S32186 together with one pick-up truck namely vehicle S460 were to be transferred to provide “welcoming revenue for the company” (sic) and that the company owed money to Mr. Mellie.

(42) *The vehicles were duly transferred on 19 August 2019 to Mr. Mellie. Again no financial transaction is shown supporting the transfer showing in the Respondents’ accounts.....”*

- [33] It is my considered view, that the above findings form the legal basis of the present disposal application. The Court expressly found that, the transfer of the vehicles to Mr. Mellie was effected without consideration and in violation of the existing interim restraint order made under Section 3 of POCCCA. The ruling establishes that, the transfers were a mechanism intended to shield assets from forfeiture proceedings and were therefore tainted as proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 3(1) (a) and (b) of POCCCA.
- [34] The Court’s findings in *The Government of Seychelles v Chang-Tave and Anor (Supra)* conclusively determined that, the relevant assets had been acquired and transferred unlawfully and that there was no genuine financial transaction supporting the purported transfer.
- [35] It is further noted, that the judgment delivered in *Government of Seychelles v Chang-Tave and Anor (Supra)* was never appealed against. Therefore, the interlocutory order made under Section 4 of POCCCA remains valid, binding, and in force. The absence of any appeal within the twelve-month period prescribed under section 5(2) of POCCCA confirms the finality of the Court’s findings that the vehicles transferred to Mr. Jean Mellie were proceeds of crime and that the transfers were effected without lawful consideration.
- [36] It must be remembered that, Mr. Mellie has not produced before this Court any documentary proof of the alleged loan he claims to have taken to purchase these vehicles, nor any supporting evidence establishing that such a loan existed or that the funds used for the acquisition of these vehicles originated from legitimate sources. Consequently, the ownership and character of the properties have already been conclusively determined, and these findings cannot be reopened or challenged at this stage of the disposal proceedings.

[37] I am reminded that Section 5(3) of the POCCCA provides that:

“Subject to subsections (8) and (10), the Court shall make a disposal order in relation to any property, the subject of an application under subsection (1) unless it is shown to its satisfaction by the respondent or any person claiming any interest in the property, that the property does not constitute, directly or indirectly, proceeds of criminal conduct and was not acquired, in whole or in part, with or in connection with property that, directly or indirectly, constitutes proceeds of criminal conduct.”

[38] My reading of this provision is that it establishes a reverse evidential burden on the Respondent or any person claiming an interest in the property to demonstrate, to the satisfaction of this Court, that the property is not **derived from or connected to criminal conduct, either directly or indirectly**. In the present case, it can be argued that Mr. Mellie did not discharge this burden. He has not produced any documentary or financial evidence showing that the vehicles listed in DJ2 were purchased with legitimate funds, nor any proof of the alleged loan he claims to have taken for their acquisition.

[39] Mr. Mellie only relies on the fact that the Applicant has confirmed that the vehicles are registered in his name. However according to the Court order, the Court did state, that the source of funds Mr. Mellie used to purchase the said vehicles could not be confirmed and that it was being used to circumvent the vehicles being seized. In the absence of such evidence, and in view of the findings by the Court in granting the interlocutory order, the presumption under section 5(3) of POCCCA remains unrebutted, and the property rightfully falls within the scope of the disposal order sought by the Republic.

[40] In the South African case of *NDPP and Another v Mohamed NO and Others 2002 (4) SA 843 (CC)*, the Constitutional Court stated that:

[41] *‘... Chapter 6 provides for forfeiture in circumstances where it is established, on a balance of probabilities, that property has been used to commit an offence ... even where no criminal proceedings in respect of the relevant crime have been instituted. ... Chapter 6 therefore, focuses not on wrongdoers, but on property that has been used to commit an*

offence or which constitutes the proceeds of crime. The guilt or wrongdoing of the owners or possessors of property is, therefore, not primarily relevant to the proceedings.

... There is, however, a defence at the second stage of the proceedings when forfeiture is being sought by the State. An owner can at that stage claim that he or she obtained the property legally and for value, and that he or she neither knew nor had reasonable grounds to suspect that the property ... had been an instrumentality in an offence ('the innocent owner' defence)."

- [42] In the Namibia case of *Shilengudwa and Another v Prosecutor-General and Others* (HC-MD-CIV-MOT-GEN-2020/00374) [2023] NAHCMD 496, the Court held that "Regarding the remedies available in terms of POCA, the PG referred to s 63 of the Act, which provides that when the High Court makes a forfeiture order in terms of s 61(1), it may exclude specific interests in property on application. In addition, s 63(2) of the Act provides that in such an application for exclusion, the 'innocent owner' must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he or she acquired the interest concerned legally and for a consideration not significantly less valuable than the value of the interest. The 'innocent owner' must also prove that he or she neither knew nor had reasonable grounds to suspect that the property in which the interest is held was the proceeds of unlawful activities."
- [43] In the Lesotho case of Directorate of Corruption and Economic Offences (CIV/APN/183/20) [2020] LSHC 27, the Court stated that "*An innocent owner defence is not a defence as such but merely a legally cognizable objective factual justification for excluding the applicant's interest from the ambit of the forfeiture order. This factual justification is placed before court post characterization of property as either instrumentality of a serious crime or proceeds of a serious crime.*"
- [44] These authorities align with the rationale of section 5(3) of POCCCA, confirming that the proceedings are *in rem*, directed against the property rather than the person, and that an "innocent owner" bears the evidential burden of establishing legitimate acquisition.
- [45] Clearly, on application of these principles, Mr. Mellie has failed to discharge this burden. He has not shown by credible evidence, that the vehicles were obtained lawfully or for

value. Nor that he was unaware of their criminal provenance. In consequence, the presumption under section 5(3) of POCCCA remains unrebutted. The vehicles, therefore, properly fall within the scope of the disposal order sought for by the Republic, and no legal basis exists for the Court to grant leave to intervene under section 117 of the SCCP.

[46] For ease of references, Section 117 of the SCCP provides that:

*“Every person interested in the event of a pending suit shall be entitled to be made a party thereto in order to maintain his rights, provided that his application to intervene is **made before all parties to the suit have closed their cases.**”* [Own emphasis].

[47] In the case of *Mari- Ange Houareau and Ors V/S Karunakaran and Ors SCA 3 of 2017*, Fernando JA had this to say;

*“I’m of the view that we have to be guided by section 117 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure in considering whether an intervention should be permitted or not is not a **matter of right but may be permitted by the Courts** only when the statutory conditions set out in section 117, for the right to intervene is shown.”* [Own emphasis]

[48] Further, in the case of *Big Country Ranch Corporation V/S Court of Appeals (227 SCAR 161 (1993))* it was held that;

*“**The right to intervene is not an absolute right.** The statutory rules or conditions for the right of intervention must be shown. The procedure to secure the right to intervene is to a great extent fixed by the statute or rule, and intervention can, as a rule, be secured only in accordance with the terms of the applicable provision. Under our rules on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.”* [Own emphasis]

[49] This statutory provision allows a person with a direct and legally recognizable interest in the outcome of ongoing proceedings to seek leave to intervene. This section is intended to prevent prejudice to third parties whose rights might be affected by a judgment but does not extend to speculative or indirect interests. The Applicant must therefore demonstrate a

genuine, existing, and legally protected interest in the subject matter of the case and not merely a remote or contingent claim.

- [50] Under Section 117 of the SCCP the application to intervene must be made before the parties have closed their cases. The present disposal proceedings arise from a final and binding interlocutory order, in that the substantive **issues of ownership and legality have already been decided on**. Allowing intervention at this stage would undermine the finality of the findings in *The Government v Chang-Tave and Anor (Supra)* and contradict the statutory purpose of POCCCA, which is to ensure swift and effective recovery of assets derived from criminal conduct.
- [51] I must reiterate and emphasis that Mr. Mellie had an opportunity to intervene during the interlocutory proceedings that resulted in the order made on 18 November 2019 under Section 4 of POCCCA. Under section 4(3), where an interlocutory order is in force, “*the Court, on application by the respondent or any other person claiming an interest in any of the property concerned, may discharge or vary the order if it is shown to its satisfaction that the property or any part thereof is not subject to confiscation, or that the order causes any other injustice to any person.*” In the instant case, despite being aware that the vehicles had been seized and that his name appeared on the registration of the said vehicles, Mr. Mellie did not exercise this right to apply for a variation or discharge of the order at that stage.
- [52] It must be remembered, that Mr. Mellie admitted in his additional affidavit dated 29 July 2025, that he had previously sworn an affidavit concerning the ownership of the vehicles listed in Annexure DJ2, which he claims belong to him. This admission demonstrates that, he had prior knowledge of, and direct involvement in the proceedings relating to the same property. Having been involved in the interlocutory proceedings by tendering affidavit evidence, Mr. Mellie cannot now claim to have been denied an opportunity to be heard.
- [53] Therefore, having failed to act when the opportunity was available under section 4(3) of POCCCA, and given that the interlocutory order has since become final and binding, Mr. Mellie cannot now apply for intervention under Section 117 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure to argue issues that were determined in 2019. His inaction during the original

proceedings, combined with his acknowledgment of having filed an affidavit regarding the same vehicles, further supports the conclusion that, the present application is both procedurally barred and without merit.

- [54] Learned counsel for the Applicant indicated, that upon reading the judgment, she became aware that Mr. Mellie had been implicated in the earlier proceedings. However, the judgment was delivered on 18 November 2019, and the present application was only filed on 25 September 2024, almost five years later. This significant delay, together with the fact that the interlocutory order remains final and binding, makes the present application both untimely and without merit. Mr. Mellie was aware, or ought to have been aware, of the proceedings and had sufficient opportunity to assert any alleged rights at the appropriate stage.
- [55] Having considered the facts, law and the evidence led before this Court, it is evident that Mr. Mellie has failed to establish any lawful interest in the property which forms the subject of these proceedings. The findings made in the interlocutory judgment remain final and binding, and the vehicles have already been lawfully disposed of pursuant to a valid court order.
- [56] Mr. Mellie was aware of the proceedings and had the opportunity to assert his alleged rights at the interlocutory stage. His own admission that he filed an affidavit concerning the said vehicles confirms, that he was fully aware of the issues now raised. He has provided no credible evidence to support his present claim.
- [57] For the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraphs of this ruling, and in the final analysis, I find no merit to allow the application, and accordingly, the application is therefore dismissed.

Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port 20th October 2025.

